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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Natu re Of The Case 
Martin Garcia-Pineda appeals from the district court's order reversing the 
magistrate's denial of the state's motion to correct an illegal sentence. Garcia-
Pineda contends the district court erred in concluding the magistrate lacked 
authority to suspend any portion of the community service requirement set forth 
in I.C. § 37-2738. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Upon investigating a report of "stolen property and narcotics activity," law 
enforcement obtained a search warrant for Garcia-Pineda's residence. (R., pp.2-
4.) The search revealed marijuana concealed in an Altoids' tin. (R., p.3.) 
Although Garcia-Pineda initially denied ownership of the marijuana, he later 
admitted the marijuana belonged to him. (R., pp.4-5.) As a result, law 
enforcement issued Garcia-Pineda a citation for possession of marijuana. (R., 
p.1.) 
Garcia-Pineda pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance in 
violation of I.C. § 37-2732(c)(3). (R., p.12.) The magistrate imposed a gO-day 
jail sentence, with 87 days suspended, and placed Garcia-Pineda on probation 
for 18 months. (R., p.12.) The magistrate also imposed 100 hours of community 
service but suspended 80 of those hours. (R., p.12.) 
Approximately one month later, the state filed an I.C.R. 35 motion, 
asserting the sentence was "contrary to law" because the magistrate did not 
"impos[e] the statutory minimum required number of hours of community 
1 
service." (R., p.13.) The magistrate denied the motion, concluding it had 
inherent authority to suspend a sentence. (8/22/2011 Tr., p.11, Ls.4-10.) The 
state appealed to the district court, which reversed the magistrate. (R., pp.16-18, 
21-29.) Garcia-Pineda filed a timely notice of appeal from the district court's 
Memorandum of Decision on Appeal. (R., pp.21, 31-33.) 
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ISSUES 
Garcia-Pineda states the issues on appeal as: 
A. Whether the District Court Erred in Holding That the 
Magistrate Court Abused Its Discretion In Suspending the 
Imposition of Community Service as a Term of Probation. 
B. Whether the District Court Erred in Reversing the Magistrate 
Court's Decision Denying the Appellant's Idaho Criminal 
Rule 35 Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.2 (formatting altered).) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Garcia-Pineda failed to establish error in the district court's decision 
that the magistrate lacked discretion to suspend any portion of the community 
service imposed as required by I.C. § 37-2738? 
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ARGUMENT 
Garcia-Pineda Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Decision 
Reversing The Magistrate's Denial Of The State's Request To Correct Garcia-
Pineda's Illegal Sentence 
A. Introduction 
Garcia-Pineda claims the district court erred in reversing the magistrate's 
denial of the state's request to correct an illegal sentence, arguing the district 
court erroneously concluded the magistrate did not have discretion to suspend 
the majority of the community service required by statute. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.2-5.) A review of the relevant statutes and applicable legal standards shows 
Garcia-Pineda's claim fails. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's 
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709,711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). The 
appellate court "examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is 
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact 
and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings." kL 
"If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if 
the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s] 
the district court's decision as a matter of procedure." kL (citing Losser, 145 
Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 
(1981 )). 
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The interpretation and application of a statute is a question of law subject 
to de novo review. State v. Jones, 151 Idaho 943, 946, 265 P .3d 1155, 1158 (Ct. 
App. 2011). "Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this 
Court must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory 
construction." kL 
C. The Magistrate Did Not Have Authority To Suspend Any Portion Of 
Garcia-Pineda's Community Service 
Idaho Code § 37-2738(5) governs sentencing criteria in drug cases and 
provides: 
Any person who pleads guilty to or is found guilty of a violation of 
the provisions of [subsections (a), (b), (c), or (e) of section 37-2732, 
Idaho Code] shall, when granted a probationary period of any sort 
whatsoever, be required by the court to complete a period of not 
less than one hundred (100) hours of community service work. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Garcia-Pineda does not dispute that he was convicted of an offense that 
subjected him to the requirements of I.C. § 37-2738(5). Instead, Garcia-Pineda 
contends the magistrate could suspend a portion of the 1 DO-hour community 
service requirement and the district court erred in concluding otherwise. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.3-5.) Garcia-Pineda is incorrect. 
Because Garcia-Pineda pled guilty to a qualifying offense and was 
granted probation, the plain language of I.C. § 37-2738(5) required the 
magistrate to order Garcia-Pineda to complete a minimum of 100 hours of 
community service. Nothing in I.C. § 37-2738(5) or any other provision of law 
authorized the magistrate to suspend any portion of the community service 
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requirement. The Court of Appeals' recent opinion in State v. Steelsmith, 288 
P.3d 132 (Ct. App. 2012), is instructive. 
In Steelsmith, the district court did not impose the statutorily mandated 
driver's license suspension until it relinquished jurisdiction. 288 P.3d at 135. The 
Court of Appeals held that although a trial court generally cannot increase a 
sentence once it has been executed, which occurs when the defendant is 
transferred to the custody of the Board of Correction, Rule 35 allowed the court 
to impose the suspension when it did because the absence of a mandatory 
license suspension in Steelsmith's original sentence made the sentence illegal. 
.!5t at 137. As explained by the Court of Appeals, "A suspension of driving 
privileges under [I.C. § 18-8005(6)(d)] is mandatory, and therefore Steelsmith's 
original sentence was illegal to the extent that it did not include a license 
suspension." lfl The Court reached the same conclusion with respect to the 
court's addition of certain mandatory fines . .!5t 
As in Steelsmith, Garcia-Pineda's original sentence was illegal because it 
failed to order him to complete the 1 DO-hour community service requirement 
mandated by I.C. § 37-2738(5). Thus, the district court correctly concluded the 
magistrate erred in denying the state's motion to correct Garcia-Pineda's illegal 
sentence. In reaching this conclusion, the district court interpreted the 1 DO-hour 
community service requirement as a term of probation that the sentencing court 
could not modify unless the defendant showed he was "not capable of 
performing" the requirement. (R., pp.27-28.) Although the 1 DO-hour requirement 
set forth in I.C. § 37-2738 is only required when the defendant is granted 
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probation, the state submits it is not a term of probation, but is a mandatory 
sentencing requirement that may not be modified by the court under any 
circumstance. 1 
However, even if the community service requirement is a statutorily 
mandated condition of probation as opposed to a mandatory sentence, as 
Garcia-Pineda argues, he has failed to cite any authority to support his claim that 
a court has inherent authority to suspend a statutory condition of probation. 
Garcia-Pineda's reliance on State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 486 P.2d 247 (1971), 
to support such a proposition is misplaced. (Appellant's Brief, p.3.) In McCoy, 
the Court considered the constitutionality of a statute that required mandatory 
imposition of 10 days in jail upon conviction for driving under the influence. The 
Court held the statute "unconstitutional and therefore nUll, void and 
unenforceable" because, the Court concluded, it interfered with the common law 
authority of the judicial branch to suspend a defendant's sentence. McCoy, 94 
Idaho at 241, 486 P.2d at 252. The opinion in McCoy, however, predated the 
amendment to section 13, article V of the Idaho Constitution, which states, in 
relevant part: "the legislature can provide mandatory minimum sentences for any 
crimes, and any sentence imposed shall be not less than the mandatory 
minimum sentence so provided. Any mandatory minimum sentence so imposed 
shall not be reduced." 
I To the extent this Court concludes the district court's rationale was erroneous, 
the Court may still affirm the result based upon the correct interpretation of the 
statute. Boise Tower Assoc., LLC. v. Hogland, 147 Idaho 774, 782, 215 P.3d 
494, 502 (2009) ("Where the lower court reaches the correct result by an 
erroneous theory, this Court will affirm the order on the correct theory."). 
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Garcia-Pineda acknowledges, as he must, that regardless of what the 
Court held in McCoy, the Idaho Constitution authorizes the legislature to require 
mandatory sentences and the courts must enforce those statutes. (Appellant's 
Brief, p.3.) Nevertheless, Garcia-Pineda attempts to draw a distinction between 
the legislative authority over sentences recognized in section 13, article V, and 
legislative control over probationary terms, asserting that the absence of any 
language in the constitution governing probation necessarily means a court can 
disregard a statutorily mandated term of probation. (Appellant's Brief, pp.2-3.) 
McCoy certainly does not support such a claim, as it did not address this 
particular issue, and Garcia-Pineda has failed to cite any other authority that 
does. 
Moreover, Garcia-Pineda's attempt to parse the constitutional authority set 
forth in section 13, article V, is not persuasive. The 1 DO-hour community service 
requirement in I.C. § 37-2738(5) is part of a legislative scheme governing the 
sentencing criteria for defendants convicted of certain drug offenses, and it falls 
squarely within the authority granted to the legislature by the Idaho Constitution. 
The magistrate had no discretion to disregard the mandate of I.C. § 37-2738(5) 
and Garcia-Pineda has failed to offer any reasoned legal basis for concluding 
otherwise. His claim that the district court erred in reversing the magistrate's 
denial of the state's Rule 35 motion fails. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
decision reversing the magistrate's denial of the state's motion to correct Garcia-
Pineda's i"egal sentence. 
DATED this 13th day of December, 20~r: 
JESSldA M. LORELLO 
Deputy iAttorney General 
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